The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (or War Report) contains the Government of "Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (Supplementary Report)" (PDF). Pakistan People's Party USA. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission was a judicial inquiry commission that assessed In , parts of the commission report were leaked to Indian and Pakistani newspapers. The full report was .. Jump up to: "The Supplement Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission" (PDF). billpercompzulbe.ga Dunya News. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report. 3. 3. Accordingly, after the prisoners of war and the civil personnel who had also been interned with the military.
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We propose finally to wind up this supplement by making the recommendations. 6 download Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report To download billpercompzulbe.ga Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report about East Pakistan Bangladesh Debacle. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report. The War Inquiry Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December The Report, PDF version.
Immense human rights violations were being reported by international organizations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch with reference to the role of Indian Security Forces in the Indian-held Kashmir. The publication of the Report was seen in Pakistan as an attempt by India to divert the world attention from its inhumane and unjustified actions in Kashmir.
Volume I of the main report dealt with political background, international relations, and military aspects of the events of Volume I of the supplementary report discussed political events of , military aspect, surrender in East Pakistan and the moral aspect. A large number of West Pakistanis and Biharis who were able to escape from East Pakistan told the Commission awful tales of the atrocities at the hands of the Awami League militants. It was revealed that many families of West Pakistani Officers and other ranks serving with East Bengal Units were subjected to inhuman treatment.
Their erstwhile Bengali colleagues had butchered a large number of West Pakistani Officers. As the tales of slaughter reached West Pakistani soldiers of other Units, they reacted violently, and in the process of restoring the authority of the Central Government, committed severe excesses on the local Bengali population.
Having dealt with the claim of General Niazi that he had no legal option but to surrender, the Commission proceeded to consider whether it was necessary for General Niazi to surrender, and whether he was justified in surrendering at that particular juncture, for most of the messages that emanated from the General Head Quarters were studiously ambiguous and designed. Secondly, General Farman Ali had suggested to him that instead of ordering surrender en masse, he should leave it to each Divisional Commander to surrender or not, according to his own circumstances.
It was maintained in the Report that the defeat suffered by the armed forces was not a result of military factors alone, but had been brought about as the cumulative result of political, international, moral and military factors.
The political developments that took place between and , including the effects of the two Martial Law periods, hastened the process of political and emotional isolation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. The dismemberment of Pakistan was also accelerated by the role played by the two major political parties, Awami League and the Pakistan Peoples Party, in bringing about a situation that resulted in postponement of the National Assembly session, scheduled to be held at Dhaka on the March 3, The events occurring between March 1 and 25, , when the Awami League had seized power from the Government, resulting in the military action of March 25, , were deplorable.
The Commission also touched upon the negotiations, which General Yahya Khan was pretending to hold during this period with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman on the one hand, and political leaders from West Pakistan on the other. Although he never formally declared these negotiations to have failed, yet he secretly left Dhaka on the evening of March 25, , leaving instructions behind for military action to be initiated as soon his plane landed at Karachi.
The Commission declared that military action could not have been substitute for a political settlement, which was feasible once law and order had been restored within a matter of few weeks after the military action. No serious effort was made to start a political dialogue with the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan.
Instead fraudulent and useless measures were adopted. The use of excessive force during the military action had only served to alienate the sympathies of the people of East Pakistan. The arbitrary methods adopted by the Martial Law Administration in dealing with respectable citizens of East Pakistan and their sudden disappearances made the situation worse.
The attitude of the Army authorities towards the Hindu minority also resulted in a large-scale exodus to India. There was wastage of considerable time during which the Indians mounted their training program for the Mukti Bahini and freely started guerillas raids into the Pakistan territory.
Nazi, Mohammad Jamshed, M. Mustafa and Brigadier-Generals G. According to the commission General Mustafa's offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area Western Front was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.
Following its submission, Bhutto classified the entire report as he was afraid that the report, which was highly critical to the role of Pakistan Defence Forces especially Army in politics, would contribute furthermore demoralization and humiliation in Pakistan Armed Forces.
However, in , Bhutto told Chief Justice Rahman that the report was either lost or stolen from the Prime minister Secretariat's record section, and it was nowhere to be found. General Zia-ul-Haq also commented that the original report is no where to be found, and nobody knows where the report actually went missing.
The report was later found in Army's report and records section by the Chief of Staff of the office. The media also quoted it was General Zia-ul-Haq who had given standing orders to the members of the Naval Intelligence who stole the report and submitted the report to him.
No action was ever taken based on this report, the report was classified and its publication disallowed at the time. All the Governments friendly to Pakistan, especially Iran, China and the USA, had made it clear to Gen Yahya that they would not be in a position to render any physical assistance to Pakistan in the event of an armed conflict with India. However, the significance of this international situation was unfortunately completely lost on Gen Yahya Khan and his associates. They blundered ahead, oblivious of the fatal consequences of their international isolation.
In the Main Report we also dealt with the activities at the United Nations during the critical days of the war, and came to the conclusion that there was no rational explanation why Gen Yahya Khan did not take the dispute to the Security Council immediately after the Indian invasion of East Pakistan on the 21st of November, , nor was it possible to explain his refusal to accept the first Russian Resolution, if indeed the situation in East Pakistan had become militarily so critical that surrender was inevitable.
While discussing the military aspect of the war in the Main Report we came to the conclusion that the major role in the disaster had been that of the ground forces, that the strategic concept embodied in war Directive No.
Having now had the advantage of examining these commanders at considerable length we feel we are in a position to formulate our final conclusions as to the causes of surrender in East Pakistan. There has been some controversy as to the exact status of Lt Gen.
Niazi, namely, whether he was a Theatre Commander or merely a Corps Commander, although he has been officially described as Commander, Eastern Command. While a Corps Commander is merely a Commander of a number of divisions placed under his command, a Theatre Commander is not merely in command of all the forces in the area, including the Naval and the Air Forces.
Niazi was not a Theatre Commander and was never designated as such. Nevertheless, situated as he was, we consider that at least from the 3rd of Dec onwards, on which date war broke out on the Western Front as well, Lt. Niazi became, for all intents and purposes, an independent Corps Commander, possessing of necessity and by force of circumstances all the powers of a Theatre Commander, and even the General Headquarters expected him to act as such, for there was no possibility thereafter of replacing him by another Commander of equivalent rank.
General Niazi's conduct of war, as also his final decision to surrender, have, therefore, to be judged in this light. The traditional concept of defence adopted by Pakistan Army was that the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan.
However Lt. Niazi contented before the Commission that the Indians would not have started an all-out war in East Pakistan if the Western Front had not been opened by Pakistan.
It seems to us that this contention is based on a lack of proper appreciation of the enemy threat which was fast developing in the Eastern Theatre.
The plan of capturing a sizable chunk of territory for setting up Bangladesh has also been frustrated by the forward deployment of our troops. An all-out war had, therefore, become inevitable for India, and in such an event the only course open for Pakistan was to implement the traditional concept of defending East Pakistan from West Pakistan in an determined and effective manner. The concept, therefore, that the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan remained valid and if ever there was need to invoke this concept it was on the 21st of Nov when the Indian troops had crossed the East Pakistan borders in naked aggression.
Unfortunately, the delay in opening the Western front and the half-hearted and hesitant manner in which it was ultimately opened only helped in precipitating the catastrophe in East Pakistan.
The detailed narrative of events as given by us in the Supplementary Report, clearly shows that the planning was hopelessly defective and there was no plan at all for the defence of Dacca, nor for any concerted effort to stem the enemy onslaught with a Division or a Brigade battle at any stage.
It was only when the general [Lt. K Niazi] found himself gradually being encircled by the enemy which had successfully managed to bypass his fortresses and reached Faridpur, Khulna, Daudkandi and Chandpur the shortest route to Dacca that he began to make frantic efforts to get the troops back for the defence of Dacca.
It was unfortunately then too late, the ferries necessary for crossing the troops over the big Jamuna river from the area of 16 Division had disappeared and the Mukti Bahini had invested the area behind, making vehicular movement impossible.
Orderly withdrawal of troops in time for concentrated defence was also made impossible by the unfortunate orders issued by Lt.
In the absence of contingency plans for the withdrawal of troops into the Dacca triangle area behind the big rivers, to prevent the enemy breakthrough and to deal if need be with the known capability of the enemy to heli-drop troops behind our lines after it had acquired mastery of the air by either eliminating or neutralising our Air Force of only one squadron, it was not at all a matter of surprise that the defences should have collapsed immediately in thin lines in the forward positions were pierced by the enemy.
On the fourth day of the all-out war major fortresses were abandoned without a fight, namely, Jessore and Jhenidah the West and the Brahmanbaria in the East.
On the next day the Comilla fortress was isolated by encirclement from all sides, and on the 9th of Dec , even a divisional commander abandoned his area of responsibility with his headquarters, leaving his formation behind. On the same day 2 more fortresses Kushtia and Laksham were abandoned.
At the latter fortress even the sick and the wounded were left behind. By 10 Dec , even Hilli, where a determined battle had been fought for 16 days had to be abandoned. The Brigade returning from Mymensingh got entangled with heli dropped Indian troops, and the Brigade Commander and some of his troops were taken prisoner. The Surrender The painful story of the last few days immediately preceding the surrender on 16 Dec has been narrated in Part IV of the Supplementary Report.
We have come to the conclusion that there was no order to surrender, but in view of the desperate picture painted by the Commander, Eastern Command, the higher authorities only gave him permission to surrender if he in his judgement thought it was necessary.
Gen Niazi could have disobeyed such an order if he thought he had the capability of defending Dacca. On his own estimate, he had 26, men at Dacca in uniform and he could have held out for at least another 2 weeks, because the enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces in the Dacca area and another week to reduce the fortress of Dacca. If Gen. Niazi had done so and lost his life in the process, he would have made history and would have been remembered by the coming generations as a great hero and a martyr, but the events show that he had already lost the will to fight after the 7th December , when his major fortresses at Jessore and Brahmanbaria had fallen.
The question of creating history, therefore, was never in his mind.